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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For many, purchasing a home is the ultimate American dream.1  But for 
some, this dream can turn into a nightmare full of unexpected repairs and 
unforeseen headaches.2  To this day, many naïve home purchasers continue 
to get saddled with costly material defects and deteriorating conditions in 
their dream homes that were never disclosed by sellers before the real estate 
transaction.3  Although the Illinois legislature has made protective strides, 
this dream-gone-bad dilemma continues to be a concern, especially today, as 
home sales in Illinois are up over last year and median prices are on the rise.4  
Throughout the last half-century, a large number of states have made 
the switch from the caveat emptor (or “buyer beware”) common law doctrine 
towards a more buyer-friendly principle that requires sellers to disclose 
known material defects in residential properties.5  In Illinois, for example, 
sellers of residential real estate have been required to disclose certain material 
defects since the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act (the Act) took 
effect on October 1, 1994.6  The purpose of the Act is to provide prospective 
buyers with information about material defects in a home that are known to 
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the seller.7  Thus, the Act protects the buyer from unanticipated defects that 
were not readily discoverable upon inspection but known by the seller.8 
However, like many changes in policy, Illinois’ mandatory disclosure 
law has left behind loopholes that sellers seemingly take advantage of by 
failing to disclose to the buyer information about known material defects in 
their property.9  For example, in a case of first impression, the Illinois Third 
District Court, in Kalkman v. Nedved, recently held that a seller is not 
obligated to disclose defective windows or doors in a home, even if those 
defects are known to the seller.10  Put another way, the Kalkman court held 
that a seller’s duty to disclose defects under the Act in the property’s walls 
did not extend to material defects in the property’s windows or doors because 
those features were not expressly mentioned in the statute.11 
The court’s analysis of “wall” within the meaning of the Act was too 
narrow and therefore failed to give enough weight to the purpose of the Act. 
This Note examines Kalkman v. Nedved in regards to the Illinois Third 
District Court’s interpretation of the Act.  It argues that the majority’s 
decision was incorrect in determining a seller’s duty to disclose defects in a 
property’s walls did not also require a seller to disclose defects in windows 
or doors.  Specifically, the term “wall” within the Act is ambiguous and the 
court should have focused on its functional definition to carry out the purpose 
of the statute.  Additionally, the majority incorrectly dismissed both parties’ 
applications of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, which directly analyzed 
an important issue in the case.  Section II of this Note analyzes the nation’s 
shift from the seller-friendly caveat emptor doctrine, and reviews the Act’s 
disclosure requirements and its purpose.  Section III discusses the facts and 
findings of the Kalkman court regarding the Act’s obligations on sellers of 
residential real estate.  Lastly, Section IV explains why the court incorrectly 
interpreted the Act and went against its purpose.  The Kalkman ruling 
essentially permits home sellers to withhold vital information about defects 
in some of the most common structures of a home for sale, thereby creating 
a loophole in a statute designed to protect Illinois home buyers. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND  
Prior to enacting its own disclosure requirement statute, real estate 
transactions in Illinois were governed by common law,12 but the Illinois 
General Assembly has since moved away from this rule towards promoting 
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a more buyer-friendly atmosphere, like many other states.13  Currently, more 
than two-thirds of states have mandatory seller-disclosure statutes intended 
to uphold that position.14  However, defining the scope and purpose of these 
kinds of statutes has been a struggle for the courts and the Act’s legislative 
intent continues to be debated.15  In fact, few courts have directly analyzed 
whether windows and doors are meant to be part of a wall under similar 
statues, adding to the difficulty.16 
A.  The Evolution from Caveat Emptor to Mandatory Disclosure  
Traditionally, sellers of real estate were not required to disclose defects 
in homes under the caveat emptor common law principle.17 A 1942 
Massachusetts case, Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, provides a classic 
example of caveat emptor’s harsh impact on unknowing home purchasers.18 
In Swinton, the purchaser claimed that the seller failed to disclose termite 
damage, which the seller knew about.19 Although the court sympathized with 
the home buyer’s dilemma, it did not hold the seller liable, noting that the 
law had not yet “reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human 
nature a standard so idealistic” as holding a seller liable for not disclosing 
known material defects.20 
This was the law of the land until a consumer protection movement 
came about in the 1960s21 and states began recognizing a number of 
inequities that arose from caveat emptor’s application to real estate 
transactions.22  Soon thereafter, courts and legislatures became open to the 
idea of imposing obligations on sellers to disclose information about that 
property being sold that “could not be discovered upon a reasonable and 
diligent inspection.”23  A landmark 1984 California Court of Appeals opinion 
first imposed this radical duty on real estate brokers and encouraged state 
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legislators throughout the country to do the same.24  The decision ripped 
through California’s real estate seller community who cried out to the 
legislature to limit their potential liability.25  Their effort spurred a California 
Association of Realtors-sponsored statute that put limits on the evolving 
common law.26  This statute laid the foundation for other states’ mandatory 
disclosure statutes; however, none are as comprehensive or far-reaching in 
protecting the home buyer as the California law.27 
Following this trend, the Illinois legislature enacted its own disclosure 
requirements for sellers of residential property less than a decade later, on 
October 1, 1994.28  The mandatory disclosure report lists twenty-three 
specific conditions or defects that sellers are required to certify whether they 
are aware of their presence in the home.29  The Act’s disclosure report covers 
features of a typical property from top-to-bottom, requiring a home seller to 
disclose material defects in the roof, walls, and basement.30  The Act further 
requires sellers to disclose the inner-workings of a home, such as problems 
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or ventilating systems; 12. I am aware of material defects in the fireplace or 
woodburning stove; 13. I am aware of material defects in the septic, sanitary sewer, or 
other disposal system; 14. I am aware of unsafe concentrations of radon on the premises; 
15. I am aware of unsafe concentrations of or unsafe conditions relating to asbestos on 
the premises; 16. I am aware of unsafe concentrations of or unsafe conditions relating 
to lead paint, lead water pipes, lead plumbing pipes or lead in the soil on the premises; 
17. I am aware of mine subsidence, underground pits, settlement, sliding, upheaval, or 
other earth stability defects on the premises; 18. I am aware of current infestations of 
termites or other wood boring insects; 19. I am aware of a structural defect caused by 
previous infestations of termites or other wood boring insects; 20. I am aware of 
underground fuel storage tanks on the property; 21. I am aware of boundary or lot line 
disputes; 22. I have received notice of violation of local, state or federal laws or 
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am aware that this property has been used for the manufacture of methamphetamine as 
defined in Section 10 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act. 
 Id. 
30. Id. 
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with the air conditioning and heating units, plumbing and electrical systems, 
and unsafe conditions with the drinking water.31  Most pertinent here, the Act 
requires sellers to disclose whether they are aware of material defects in the 
main contours of a room, including the ceiling, walls, and floors.32  
Additionally, the Act does not hold home sellers liable for inaccuracies, 
omissions, or errors so long as the seller had no knowledge of such or the 
seller thought the condition had been properly addressed and repaired.33  That 
said, a seller who knowingly violates the Act and fails to truthfully comply 
with its disclosure requirements can be held liable for damages.34  The seller 
also does not necessarily have to conceal the defective condition in the home 
to be liable, but the home buyer nonetheless must prove the seller had an 
intent to deceive.35  The Act, also, does not relieve the seller of its duty to 
disclose defects once the buyer hires a professional inspector to investigate 
the property.36 
Moreover, courts have struggled to define the scope and purpose of this 
and similar statutes, and the Act’s legislative intent continues to be debated.37 
B.  Legislative Intent and the Purpose of the Act 
Since its enactment, some courts have attempted to interpret the 
legislative intent behind the Act to help determine its scope and purpose.38 
Although the Act has undergone several changes since its original enactment, 
its purpose has remained the same: “to provide prospective buyers with 
information about material defects in the residential real property.”39  
Further, Illinois courts have held that statutes must be given their plain and 
ordinary meaning, which is ascertained by looking at the term’s dictionary 
definitions, but the existence of multiple definitions, that each make sense, 
suggests statutory ambiguity.40 
For instance, in Bauer v. Giannis, the court determined that the Act’s 
purpose was to provide prospective buyers with information about defects in 
the home and to subsequently seek recourse for their misplaced reliance on 
the seller’s disclosures in the report.41  In Bauer, the home sellers failed to 
disclose a leakage problem in the home’s basement, and a few years after 
                                                                                                                                      
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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purchasing, the home flooded after a heavy rain, filling the basement with as 
much as eight feet of water.42  The court held that “allowing a seller to . . . 
avoid reporting a material defect, and thereby defeat a buyer’s subsequent 
claim [for fraud] would only encourage the evils the legislature sought to 
remedy.”43  
Similarly, in Penn v. Gerig, the court opined that the Act was enacted 
to strike a balance between the interests of home buyers and sellers: giving 
home buyers certain protections not previously enjoyed (such as recovering 
damages for repairs) while protecting the seller against unlimited liability 
under the Act (such as a statute of limitations on a buyer’s ability to bring 
suit).44 Thus, the court seemingly recognized Illinois’ shift from “buyer 
beware” towards providing the buyer certain legal remedies.45  
Moreover, in Muir v. Merano, the court held that the purpose of the 
Act’s disclosure report is to provide the prospective buyer with knowledge 
of any material defects in the home equal to that of the seller, which the buyer 
may rely on when deciding whether to purchase the property.46  The court 
also highlighted the importance of requiring sellers to fill out the Act’s 
disclosure report truthfully or to the best of their ability.47 
On a related note, in Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., the court analyzed 
statutory ambiguity and held that “the existence of alternative dictionary 
definitions of [a word], each making sense under the statute, itself indicates 
that the statute is open to interpretation.”48  Opining that statutory language 
must be accorded to its “plain and ordinary meaning” to determine the intent 
of the legislature, the Supreme Court of Illinois in its analysis looked at 
several dictionary definitions, but ultimately determined that the dictionary 
definitions did not definitively reveal the intent of the legislature.49  Thus, the 
court determined that the term was ambiguous and resorted to other aids of 
construction to discern its meaning.50  Upon that determination, the court 
concluded that the legislature intended the broader meaning of the ambiguous 
term because “it [was] a general principle of statutory interpretation that 
[they] give statutes the fullest, rather than the narrowest, possible meaning to 
which they are susceptible.”51 
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In sum, Illinois has come a long way from the caveat emptor common 
law doctrine, evidenced by enacting its own mandatory disclosure 
requirements to protect home purchasers.52 A summary of case law and the 
express language of the Act also suggest that the central purpose of the Act 
is quite clear: to provide potential home buyers with information about 
known defects in the residential real estate.53  Additionally, when attempting 
to ascertain a statute’s plain and ordinary meaning, Illinois courts have held 
that the existence of several dictionary definitions suggests ambiguity.54 
Despite this, in Kalkman v. Nedved, the court’s analysis of “wall” 
within the meaning of the Act was too narrow and failed to give enough 
weight to the purpose of the Act. 
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE 
In Kalkman v. Nedved, the Illinois Third District Court considered 
whether the obligation to disclose material defects in “walls” of a home-for-
sale also required a seller to disclose material defects in the home’s windows 
and doors under the Act.55  The Kalkman court held that a seller’s duty to 
disclose material defects under the Act’s disclosure requirements did not 
extend to windows or doors because the dictionary definition suggests 
“windows” and “doors” are not part of the walls.56  
A.  Facts 
In 2009, Defendants George and Maureen Nedved put their lakefront 
home in Knox County, Illinois, up for sale.57  The following year, Plaintiffs 
Jason and Lucia Kalkman became interested in the Nedveds’ home from an 
online advertisement listing the property.58  After falling in love with the 
home, the Kalkmans submitted a purchase offer.59  
Prior to the sale, the Nedveds filled out the mandatory disclosure report 
required under the Act, claiming no knowledge of any material defects or 
conditions of the home and answering in the negative for all twenty-three 
items.60  Upon receipt of the Nedveds’ completed disclosure report, the 
parties executed a contract for purchase of the home, subject to an inspection 
                                                                                                                                      
52. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35 (2009).  
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and on the condition that the Kalkmans were allowed to spend a night in the 
home and examine it themselves.61  After a formal inspection revealed no 
significant problems and the sale was finalized, the Kalkmans moved in.62 
However, shortly after the move in, the Kalkmans discovered a variety 
of leaks in the windows and doors.63  For example, water entered the house 
through an improperly-installed patio door on the second floor when it 
rained, which soaked the carpet, floor, and walls in the first floor below.64 
Upon closer examination, the new home buyers discovered many of the 
windows would not close normally because they, too, had been improperly 
installed or warped by the elements.65 
As a result, the Kalkmans filed a formal complaint against the Nedveds 
in the Circuit Court of Knox County, alleging that the Nedveds’ failure to 
disclose the defects in the windows and doors constituted a violation of the 
Act as well as common law fraud.66  The circuit court granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of the Nedveds on several issues, but the 
remaining issue before the court was whether the Nedveds were required to 
disclose the defective windows and doors under item six of the disclosure 
report, which reads “I am aware of material defects in the walls and floors.”67 
The circuit court found that the “problems with the windows [and] patio 
door . . . were material defects, that they existed when the home was sold, 
and that the Nedveds were aware of those defects when they filled out the 
disclosure report.”68  The circuit court then decided that the Act should be 
interpreted broadly to best give effect to the intent of the legislature in 
protecting home buyers from hidden defects known by sellers.69  Thus, the 
court determined defects in the windows and doors were required to be 
disclosed under the Act’s provision governing disclosure of defects in 
walls.70  
The circuit court’s rationale followed that windows and doors 
ultimately serve the same purpose as walls: to protect the interior of the home 
from the outside elements.71  The court determined that, although “[windows 
and doors] may serve the additional function of allowing light to pass 
through, and may provide a means of ingress and egress from the 
building . . . when they are closed their purpose is the same as a wall” and 
                                                                                                                                      
61. Id. at ¶ 5, 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
62. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
63. Id. at ¶ 6, 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
64. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
65. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
66. Id. at ¶ 7, 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
67. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
68. Id. at ¶ 8, 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
69. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
70. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
71. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891.  
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because they are not specifically excluded from the disclosure report, the 
defects in windows and doors must be reported.72  Due to the Nedveds’ 
failure to disclose, the circuit court ruled in favor of the Kalkmans.73 
B.  Majority Opinion 
As a result, the Nedveds appealed the circuit court’s ruling, alleging 
that they were not required to disclose material defects in the windows or 
doors because those conditions were not expressly listed under the Act.74  As 
such, the Illinois Third District Court was tasked with analyzing whether 
sellers were required to disclose material defects in a home’s windows and 
doors under the Act.75  The court began its analysis by attempting to 
“ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent.”76  
1.  Plain and Ordinary Meaning Analysis 
The Kalkman court opined that the case turned on how broadly it 
construed the term “wall,” which is not defined in the Act, and noted that this 
was a case of first impression in Illinois.77  The appellate court first dismissed 
both parties’ arguments regarding whether the Act’s use of the term “wall” 
includes windows and doors within the definition, as the arguments based on 
the Lopez majority and dissent were both unpersuasive.78  
Then, the court reviewed a dictionary definition to determine the term’s 
plain and ordinary meaning, citing the Nedveds’ supplied definition from the 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language.79  This definition termed 
“wall” as “any of various permanent upright constructions having a length 
much greater than the thickness and presenting a continuous surface except 
where pierced by doors, windows, etc.,” which the majority held implies 
windows and doors are not included within the definition of wall, but are 
instead separate components.80  The Kalkmans failed to cite a dictionary 
definition, and thus the court determined that, using the Nedveds’ definition 
                                                                                                                                      
72. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
73. Id. at ¶ 9, 991 N.E.2d at 892. 
74. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 892. 
75. Id. at ¶ 1, 991 N.E.2d at 890.  
76. Id. at ¶ 12, 991 N.E.2d at 892.  
77. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17, 991 N.E.2d at 893. 
78. Id. at ¶ 18, 991 N.E.2d at 893 (finding that neither the Lopez majority nor dissent was particularly 
persuasive.  “The majority relies on an outdated notion that a wall must support a building’s 
structure . . . The thrust of the dissent is that the majority did not adequately distinguish a previous 
Pennsylvania case.  Therefore, neither’s rationale determines whether the Act’s use of the term 
walls includes windows and doors within its definition.”). 
79. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 893. 
80. Id. at ¶ 19, 991 N.E.2d at 893 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2139 
(2d ed. 1987)). 
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as well as common usage, it was reasonable to conclude that the ordinary 
definition of wall does not include windows and doors.81 
2.  Maxims of Statutory Construction Analysis 
Because the Act modifies the common law caveat emptor rule, the court 
ruled that the statute must be strictly construed.82  Citing Williams v. Chester, 
the court held that “a statute in derogation of the common law cannot be 
construed as changing the common law beyond what the statutory language 
expresses, or is necessarily implied from what is expressed.”83  Given the 
supplied dictionary definition, the court found that it was not necessarily 
implied that windows and doors are included within the legislature’s concept 
of walls.84  Additionally, the court employed the expresio unius est exclusion 
alterius canon, which provides that lists in statutes are complete, and, thus, 
the omissions should be understood as exclusions.85  
As a result, the court held that the twenty-three enumerated conditions 
or defects listed in the Act which a seller must disclose implied the 
legislature’s intent not to include windows or doors to be covered by the 
disclosure report.86  The court further held that the Act is “clearly not 
intended to cover all potential material defects in a residential property,” 
based on the plain language of the statute, which is a “ʻdisclosure of certain 
conditions.’”87  For instance, the court mentioned other state disclosure 
statutes include a “catch-all” provision requiring the seller to disclose all 
known material defects to a property and the Illinois legislature could have 
included such a provision if it wanted.88 
3.  Purpose of the Statute Analysis 
The appellate court did not believe the purpose of the statute would be 
injured if the seller was not required to disclose known defects in the 
windows or doors of a home.89  Specifically, the court dismissed the 
Kalkman’s citing of Bauer because its holding did not apply to the issue of 
the case at bar.  Rather, Bauer addressed a material defect (e.g., a flooding 
problem) that was not disclosed by the sellers of a home, which is specifically 
                                                                                                                                      
81. Id. at ¶ 20, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
82. Id. at ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
83. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 894 (citing Williams v. Manchester, 888 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2008)). 
84. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
85. Id. at ¶ 22, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
86. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
87. Id. at ¶ 23, 991 N.E.2d at 894 (quoting 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35 (2009) (emphasis added)). 
88. Id. at ¶ 23, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
89. Id. at ¶ 25, 991 N.E.2d at 895. 
2015]  Casenote 383 
 
required by the Act to be disclosed.90  That said, the court stated “allowing 
sellers to avoid reporting what they are obligated to disclose would encourage 
the evils the legislature sought to remedy,” but the Act does not contain such 
an obligation for doors and windows, so it was essentially a moot point.91 
The court also believed that its ruling would neither create a loophole in the 
Act nor put buyers at a disadvantage; rather, its ruling acknowledged the 
Act’s limits that only call for certain, specified disclosures.92  
C.  Justice Lytton’s Special Concurrence 
Justice Lytton agreed with the majority’s reasoning but wrote 
separately to analyze whether the Illinois legislature intended to include 
windows and/or doors in the Act.93  “Since the language of the Act is narrow, 
our narrow interpretation of the statute is the correct one.”94  However, 
Justice Lytton continued, if the legislature’s intent was to avoid situations 
like the case at bar, the legislature should be made aware and the Act’s intent 
may be more fully realized if it were amended.95 
IV.  ANALYSIS  
The majority in Kalkman was incorrect in its determination that a 
seller’s duty to disclose defects in a property’s walls also did not impose an 
obligation to disclose defects in windows or doors.  The term “wall” within 
the Act is ambiguous, and therefore, the court should have focused on its 
functional definition to carry out the purpose of the statute, which is to ensure 
home buyers are protected from unknown conditions that materially affect 
various functions of the residence.  The Kalkman court’s decision essentially 
creates a loophole that permits home sellers to knowingly withhold 
information about defects in a property that could significantly affect a 
home’s value (e.g., leaky windows or doors that do not seal properly).  Part 
A of this Section discusses why the appellate court’s failure to recognize the 
various alternative definitions of the term “wall” was inappropriate and 
ultimately led to the wrong outcome.  Part B analyzes why the majority 
should have taken a broader approach and why its narrow approach was 
incorrect.  Lastly, Part C reviews why the majority’s holding goes against the 
central purpose of the Act. 
                                                                                                                                      
90. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 895; see also 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35. 
91. Kalkman, at ¶ 25, 991 N.E.2d at 895. 
92. Id. at ¶ 26, 991 N.E.2d at 895. 
93. Id. at ¶ 32, 991 N.E.2d at 895–96 (Lytton, J., concurring).  
94. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 895–96. 
95. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 895–96. 
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A.  “Wall” Does Not Exclude Windows and Doors 
Several dictionary definitions and relevant case law suggest the 
Kalkman court incorrectly determined “wall” excludes windows and doors.96 
The majority erred in reaching this conclusion because it wrongly limited the 
scope of its analysis and determined that the term was not ambiguous.97  The 
court utilized only the Random House Dictionary definition supplied by the 
Nedveds and what it termed “common usage” to determine that the wall’s 
plain and ordinary meaning excluded windows and doors.98  Although the 
court correctly reasoned that “[b]ecause ‘wall’ is not defined by the Act, the 
court may look to a dictionary definition to determine the term’s plain and 
ordinary meaning,”99 the majority failed to take into account other relevant 
definitions of “wall” that are pertinent to a proper analysis.  Had the majority 
broadened its analysis beyond the Nedveds’ supplied definition it would have 
found that the term was reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.100 
Thus, the term “wall” is ambiguous and could encompass windows and doors 
within its meaning.  
For instance, The Law Dictionary defines wall as “an erection of stone, 
brick, or other material, raised to some height, and intended for purposes of 
security or enclosure.”101  Similarly, Merriam-Webster defines the same as 
“the structure that forms the side of a room or building” and more fully as 
“something resembling a wall (as in appearance, function, or effect); 
especially: something that acts as a barrier or defense.”102  Windows and 
doors certainly fall under the scope of these other definitions that the Illinois 
Third District Court failed to consider.  Like walls, windows are also made 
of “other material, raised to some height . . . intended for . . . enclosure.”103 
Windows and doors are intended to keep the outside weather elements from 
entering a home and are therefore similar to walls.  Moreover, windows and 
doors are also part of a structure that “forms the side of a room” and closely 
resembles the function of a wall, acting as a barrier or defense.104  Contrary 
to the majority’s rationale, these definitions imply windows and doors are 
included within the definition of wall and are not considered separate 
                                                                                                                                      
96. See What is Wall?, THE LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/wall/ (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015) (emphasis added); Wall, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/wall (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Lopez v. Gukenback, 137 A.2d 771, 777 
(Pa. 1958). 
97. See Kalkman, at ¶¶ 20–24, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
98. Id. at ¶ 20, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
99. Id. at ¶ 19, 991 N.E.2d at 893. 
100. Id. at ¶ 20, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
101. THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 96 (emphasis added).  
102. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, supra note 96. 
103. THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 96.  
104. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, supra note 96.  
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components.105  However, the court incorrectly limited its analysis to the 
Nedveds’ definition and what they defined as “common usage.”106  
Additionally, the majority should have followed suit with the trial 
court’s analysis that doors and windows have similar functions.107 
Specifically, the trial court held that “ʻdoors and windows and walls all serve 
the same purpose, i.e., to protect the interior of the building from the elements 
. . . [windows and doors] are not specifically excluded from the [Act’s] 
Disclosure Report and therefore defects to doors and windows must be 
reported.’”108  This is yet another example proving the term “wall” is 
ambiguous and subject to more than one interpretation and further evidence 
windows and doors are viewed quite similar to walls in terms of function and 
purpose.109 
Along those same lines, the majority incorrectly dismissed both parties’ 
applications of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, which directly analyzed 
whether a window was an inherent and integral part of the wall of the 
building.110  The Kalkman majority found the Lopez decision unpersuasive to 
the issue-at-hand because the Pennsylvania majority relied on an outdated 
notion that a wall supports a building’s structure and, additionally, the thrust 
of its dissent did not particularly analyze whether a window was part of a 
wall.111  Although Lopez was a personal injury case centered on Pennsylvania 
landlord-tenant law, it is most certainly relevant to the case-at-bar because it 
is one of few opinions-on-point that attempts to directly analyze the 
similarities and concurrent relationship between a wall and a window.112  For 
example, while the Lopez majority ultimately held that a window was not 
part of a wall because its presence “contributed nothing to, nor had it any 
functional use in connection with the other apartments or parts of the 
building,”113 Justice Musmanno’s dissent reasoned that if a skylight is part of 
a roof, then a window is part of a wall, primarily due to its function and 
location within a wall.114  The dissenting justice further opined that “a 
window dow [sic] is as much an integral part of a wall as the skylight is an 
integral part of the roof.”115  Although this analogy was not the focus of the 
                                                                                                                                      
105. THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 96; MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, supra note 96. 
106. Kalkman v. Nedved, 2013 IL App (3d) 120800, ¶ 20, 991 N.E.2d 404, 404. 
107. Id. at ¶ 8, 991 N.E.2d at 401. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Lopez v. Gukenback, 137 A.2d 771, 777 (Pa. 1958) (holding that a window was not an integral part 
of the wall; thus, the court reasoned that the landlord could not be held liable for injuries sustained 
by the tenant because he was not in sole possession or control of the defective window).  
111. Kalkman, at ¶ 18, 991 N.E.2d at 893. 
112. See Lopez, 137 A.2d at 777. 
113. Id. at 776. 
114. Id. at 779. 
115. Id. 
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dissent,116 it nonetheless is persuasive and at the very least establishes some 
similarities between a wall and a window due to the fact that they both make 
up a structure and perform similar functions.117 
B. The Act Should Be Interpreted Broadly 
Caselaw also suggests that the Kalkman majority should have taken a 
broader approach when interpreting this statute because the meaning of 
“wall” does not have one single plain meaning, rather, it is ambiguous.118 
Most relevant is the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in Landis, which held 
“ʻthe existence of alternative dictionary definitions of [a word], each making 
sense under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to 
interpretation’” and the court should resort to other aids of statutory 
construction.119  As shown above, several alternative dictionary definitions 
of the term “wall” exist and each make sense when applying them under the 
Act.120  Thus, following the holding in Landis, in light of the alternative 
definitions, it should be “clear that the dictionary definitions do not 
definitively resolve the question as to which meaning the legislature 
intended.”121  The Kalkman majority therefore should have taken a broader 
approach and used other methods of interpretation, such as giving greater 
weight to the express purpose of the Act.122 
Although Kalkman adhered to the principle that statutes in derogation 
of the common law must be strictly construed,123 the majority should have 
taken the method followed by Landis because “wall” is ambiguous within the 
Act.  Landis held it to be a general principle of statutory interpretation to give 
statutes their fullest, rather than narrowest, possible meaning to which they 
are susceptible in the case of ambiguity.124  The Illinois Supreme Court 
decision also stated that the “absence of any indication that the legislature 
intended the term . . . to have a narrower meaning, we conclude that the 
legislature intended the broader meaning.”125  Given the multiple dictionary 
definitions and no evidence suggesting the Illinois legislature meant for 
“wall” to have a narrower meaning, the Kalkman majority should have given 
the fullest possible meaning to which the term “wall” is susceptible, instead 
                                                                                                                                      
116. Kalkman, at ¶ 18, 991 N.E.2d at 403. 
117. Id. at ¶ 8, 991 N.E.2d at 401. 
118. See Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 919 N.E.2d 300, 306 (Ill. 2009).  
119. Id. (quoting Nat’l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 418 (1992)).  
120. MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, supra note 96; THE LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 96. 
121. Landis, 919 N.E.2d at 306.  
122. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35 (2009). 
123. Kalkman v. Nedved, 2013 IL App (3d) 120800, ¶ 21, 991 N.E.2d 889, 894. 
124. Landis, 919 N.E.2d at 306.  
125. Id.  
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of narrowing its interpretation and inappropriately adhering to the 
“derogation of common law” principle.126 
Further, the majority’s utilization of the expresio unius est exclusion 
alterius canon of statutory construction was inappropriately applied and 
relied on because the Kalkman court should have taken a more functional 
approach in its analysis.127  Using the statutory maxim, the majority inferred 
“when a statute lists the things to which it applies, the omissions should be 
understood as exclusions” and, therefore, the listing in the Act is complete.128 
While it is true the legislature chose to enumerate twenty-three specific 
defects to be disclosed by the seller, the omission of the terms “windows” 
and “doors” does not mean that the legislature purposefully intended to 
exclude those types of material defect disclosures under the Act.129  Rather, 
in light of the reasons above, a more functional approach suggests the 
legislature assumed mentioning windows and doors was unnecessary 
because they intended for those terms to be included within the definition of 
wall, thus requiring mandatory disclosure of those features. 
Moreover, as the majority pointed out, the Act is not intended to cover 
all potential material defects in residential property, which would burden the 
seller.130  However, the court incorrectly suggested that the legislature 
purposefully intended to leave out windows and doors.131  For instance, 
among the twenty-three listed items, the Act expressly requires the seller to 
disclose whether they are aware of material defects in the floors, walls, and 
ceilings.132  The legislature could have followed other states’ leads133 and 
assumed enumerating the common structural components of a room would 
have made the disclosure requirements adequately all-encompassing, as a 
room is generally made up of a floor, walls, and a ceiling.134  Further, it is 
important to note that “a seller’s underlying common-law obligation, which 
survives [the mandatory disclosure statute], is to disclose all known material 
latent defects.”135  This suggests that the legislature did not intend to permit 
sellers to dodge their duty to disclose defects in the components that make 
                                                                                                                                      
126. Kalkman, at ¶ 5, 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
127. Id. at ¶ 22, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
128. Id. at ¶ 6, 991 N.E.2d at 891.   
129. Id., 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
130. Id. at ¶ 23, 991 N.E.2d at 894. 
131. Id. at ¶ ¶ 23–24, 991 N.E.2d at 894–95. 
132. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35 (2009).  
133. “Most other states’ disclosure forms list structural components of a property, such as such as 
driveways, retaining walls, bearing walls, chimneys, windows, doors, exterior stucco, floors, 
foundations, and roofs,” to name a few.  Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 233. 
134. See generally Examples of What Are or Aren’t Structural Components of Buildings, Fed. Tax 
Coordinator Second Series (RIA), ¶ L-17243, 1997 WL 553570 (2015). 
135. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 235.  
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up a wall, such as drafty windows or leaky doors, as was the occurrence in 
Kalkman.136 
C.  The Majority Goes Against the Purpose of the Act 
The majority’s decision in Kalkman goes against the purpose of the Act, 
which is to protect home buyers.137  This is demonstrated by the statute’s 
express language as well as a brief summary of caselaw.138 
The Act’s purpose is expressly stated in the statute, which is “to provide 
prospective buyers with information about material defects in the residential 
real property.”139  Caselaw puts it a similar way, holding the purpose of the 
Act is to provide potential buyers with information about known material 
defects in the home.140  In Kalkman, the home sellers even acknowledged 
their awareness of the defective windows, but the court still refused to hold 
them liable for such non-disclosures—in contradiction to the legislature’s 
purpose.141  This suggests that the Kalkman majority gave inadequate 
deference to the purpose of the Act because, as discussed above, the 
legislative intent was to include windows and doors within the definition of 
“wall.” 
Although the majority denies its decision will create a loophole in the 
statute, its holding does in fact put buyers at an unfair disadvantage.142  
Sellers of real estate have far greater knowledge about the condition of their 
homes than a potential buyer and thus should be compelled to share that 
information. 143  Additionally, although the Kalkman majority suggested that 
home buyers should obtain an inspection and conduct due diligence before 
purchasing residential real estate property to avoid this problem, that 
suggestion has no merit because the Kalkmans had a formal home inspection 
done, and it failed to reveal any significant problems.144  
Finally, on a policy level, the Kalkman majority goes against the 
gradual progress Illinois has made from the principle of caveat emptor and 
reverts the state back to the “buyer beware” days of old.  Even the majority 
admits that the Act grants a home buyer certain recourse if a defect in the 
property is discovered, “modifying the harsh common law doctrine of caveat 
                                                                                                                                      
136. Kalkman, at ¶ 6, 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
137. Muir v. Merano, 882 N.E.2d 716, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
138. See id.; see also Kalkman, at ¶ 25, 991 N.E.2d at 895; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35 (2009). 
139. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 77/35. 
140. Kalkman, at ¶ 16, 991 N.E.2d at 893 (emphasis added); Muir, 882 N.E.2d at 716.  
141. Kalkman, at ¶ 11, 991 N.E.2d at 892. 
142. Id. at ¶ 26, 991 N.E.2d at 895.  
143. Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and Attempts to Reallocate the Risk, 
34 CONN. L. REV. 1, 40 (2001). 
144. Kalkman, at ¶ 5, 991 N.E.2d at 891. 
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emptor.”145  The Illinois legislature’s enactment of the mandatory disclosure 
statute demonstrates its willingness to depart from this common law principle 
towards a more buyer-friendly landscape.  The legislative action further 
suggests the General Assembly’s recognition of this problem and its intent to 
enact statutes that protect home buyers from the unknown, such as faulty 
components that are essential to a home (e.g., windows and walls). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Illinois Court of Appeals for the Third District was incorrect in 
determining a seller’s duty to disclose defects in a property’s walls did not 
also impose an obligation to disclose defects in windows or doors.  The 
dictionary definition of “wall” gives no clear guidance of its plain and 
ordinary meaning, and the term’s ambiguity therefore suggests it does not 
necessarily exclude windows or doors from its definition.  On the contrary, 
limited on-point caselaw further demonstrates a window can, in fact, be 
interpreted to be part of a wall because of its similar function and placement 
within a wall.  Similarly, the Illinois circuit court’s reasoning that windows, 
doors, and walls all serve the same purpose, which is to protect the interior 
from the elements, suggests they can all be one within the same.  Therefore, 
windows and walls are not necessarily excluded from the definition of “wall” 
within the meaning of the Act. Additionally, the Act should have been 
interpreted broadly, rather than narrowly, to give the statutory language the 
fullest possible meaning to which it is susceptible. A broader interpretation 
should have been taken by the Kalkman majority because of the statute’s 
multiple interpretive possibilities.  Although the legislature chose to 
enumerate twenty-three specific conditions to disclose under the Act, the 
legislature’s omission of windows and doors does not suggest it purposefully 
intended to exclude disclosure of those conditions.  Further, if sellers are not 
required to disclose known material defects in a home’s windows and doors, 
then the purpose of the Act will be injured and such a policy would encourage 
the exact evils the legislature sought to remedy.  The Illinois Fourth District 
Court’s decision to allow property defects to stay hidden from the buyer goes 
beyond common sense and is contrary to the legislature’s purpose to protect 
the home buyer from unforeseen headaches known by the seller. 
                                                                                                                                      
145. Id. at ¶ 3, 991 N.E.2d at 890. 
